THE ROLE OF THOMAS HOBBES’ TEACHINGS ON NATURAL LAW IN THE PROCESS OF FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE (FAIR TRIAL)

Abstract

When preparing the article, the author set the goal of determining the role of T. Hobbs’ teachings on natural laws in the process of formation and development of the concept of justice (fair trial). The article clarifies the essence of the justified and formulated natural laws of the search for peace and the pursuit of peace, justice, impartiality, about mediators, about submission to arbitration, about the impossibility of being one’s own judge, on the prohibition of a person to be a judge in a case in which he, due to natural reasons, has a interest, as well as on witnesses. Based on the analysis of these laws, it was concluded that the teachings of T. Hobbes about natural laws played an important role in the process of formation and development of the concept of justice (fair trial). This is confirmed by the theoretical principle of the current national legislation of Ukraine, namely, established in the Constitution of Ukraine the right of everyone to protect their rights and freedoms from violations and illegal encroachments by any means not prohibited by law, as well as guaranteeing everyone the protection of their rights and freedoms by the court; recognition as the source and basis of justice in the relationship between the subjects of the law, the obligation of the parties to fulfill the agreements concluded by them; legislative enshrinement as a necessary condition for the administration of justice to ensure the impartial resolution of legal disputes by the court, which are carried out within procedural law enforcement relations; recognition of the independence and inviolability of judges, as mediators, in the resolution of legal disputes and the imperative requirement of mandatory execution of court decisions for the parties – participants in the court process; affirmation of the legal axiom in the legal consciousness of civil society, according to which “no one can be a judge in his own case”; recognition of a judge’s impartiality as an obstacle to a fair trial and reason for recusal of the judge, as well as the recognition of legally significant information contained in the testimony of witnesses as evidence that does not have advantages in comparison with the information contained in the testimony of other witnesses in the case; legislative consolidation of the principles that the evidence should be evaluated by the judge only in their totality, which is a necessary condition for the administration of justice.